Mutual fund flows’ performance reaction: does convexity apply to small markets? by Carlos F. Alves & Victor Mendes
F E P    W O R K I N G    P A P E R S F E P    W O R K I N G    P A P E R S
Mutual Mutual fund flows’ fund flows’ performance performance
reaction reaction: does : does convexity apply convexity apply to to
small markets small markets? ?
Carlos F. Alves* 
Victor Mendes
*CEMPRE - Centro de Estudos 
Macroeconómicos e Previsão
Research – Work in Progress – n. 204,  February 2006
Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-464 Porto | Tel. 225 571 100
Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto
Tel. 225571100 | www.fep.up.ptMUTUAL FUND FLOWS’ PERFORMANCE REACTION:  




•, Faculty of Economics, University of Porto 
Rua Dr. Roberto Frias 
4200-464 Porto  
Portugal 
Telephone: +351 225 571 100 




 CMVM - Portuguese Securities Commission 
Avenida da Liberdade, 252  
1056-801 Lisboa 
Portugal 
Telephone: +351 213177000 




JEL: G21, G23 and G28 






In this paper we study the performance reaction of investors in a small market context. Instead of 
the asymmetrical investors’ reaction to winners and losers, as usually documented for the US, an 
absence of risk-adjusted performance reaction was observed. The absence of reaction can be 
attributed to either lower investor sophistication, conflicts of interests in the context of the 
Portuguese universal banking industry, or the existence of relevant back-end load cost which 
prevent investors from reacting. A high persistence of net investment flows was also noted. Our 
results are consistent with the idea that the financial groups with larger market shares have the 
capacity “to drive” their customers to funds with larger fees. This practice emerges as a non-
transparent means of increasing prices.  
 
                                                 
• CEMPRE is supported by CFT through POCTI of the QCAIII, which is financed by FEDER and Portuguese funds.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The study of the performance reaction of mutual funds investors has been a matter of 
investigation for developed markets, particularly the US. However, as far as we know, there are 
not such studies for small and emergent markets. Nevertheless, there are reasons to suspect that in 
small markets the reaction of mutual fund investors can be quite different from that of investors 
in more developed and complex markets. On the one hand, small markets are less complex and 
products are less differentiated than in the US mutual fund industry, thus simplifying the task of 
calculating performance (with the correspondent lower information costs for retail investors). 
This conjecture leads one to expect a more effective performance reaction in smaller markets that 
in more developed markets. On the other hand, small markets are less developed and less 
competitive, and one can also conjecture that the information dissemination process is less 
efficient. This may bring about higher information costs, and less effective performance reaction. 
Finally, inferior investor sophistication and organization of the mutual fund industry can also lead 
to different investor behaviour in small markets.  
 
Some of the attempts to explain the phenomenon of asymmetrical performance reaction are as 
much applicable to large and complex markets as to smaller and emerging markets. This is the 
case of the explanation based on investors' cognitive dissonance and the theory relative to the 
expected about-turn of investment policy. However, the applicability of the theory of the 
industry's complexity and the concomitant difficulty to compute and compare performances (and 
the inherent costs of acquiring information) to small economies, with financial systems 
characterized by a reduced number of intermediaries and mutual funds, is not straightforward. In 
a market with fewer (and easy to compare) mutual funds, the task of retail investors 
distinguishing between good and bad performances can be less complex and less costly.  This 
leads one to suspect that, in small markets, mutual funds flows react symmetrically to the mutual 
fund performances.  
 
However, small markets are less developed and competitive, and the information dissemination 
process is likely less efficient. This leads to higher costs of acquiring information about the stock 
market, as well as the ongoing cost of monitoring a portfolio of risky assets, and may bring about 
a sub-optimal performance reaction. Moreover, when the small market is also characterized by a 
universal banking system, where in the same holding we can find retail banking and fiduciary  
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management (including the mutual fund management), the hypothesis of absence of reaction 
again makes sense. In this case, differing from the US, there are no independent brokers between 
retail investors and mutual fund managers. The bank who sells the mutual fund is a member of 
the holding. Therefore, when a bank customer asks for advice regarding mutual fund investment, 
the advice he/she gets can be biased due to conflicts of interest. As a result, absence of mutual 
fund performance reaction is expected. 
 
It is important to investigate whether the asymmetry documented for large and complex markets 
also exists in emerging markets, and smaller and less complex, but also less developed, markets. 
However, no study on the performance reaction of investors in funds in emerging and/or smaller 
markets is known to exist.  
 
The aim of this study is to fill this gap. The performance reaction of mutual funds’ investors is 
analysed in the domestic environment of the Portuguese mutual fund industry. There are two 
reasons why the Portuguese market is studied. Firstly, the Portuguese securities' market is small 
in size: in March 2001 there were only 261 mutual funds, managing a total net asset value (NAV) 
of 21 390 million euros. Those mutual funds were managed by 19 management companies. In the 
segment of equity funds predominantly investing in Portuguese shares, only 30 funds have 
existed from 1st January 1994 to 31st March 2001. The total amount managed by these 30 funds 
reached its maximum value in April 1998, 1805.6 million euros. These figures are in stark 
contrast to the complexity and dimension of the US market, where the total managed value 
surpassed 3.3 trillion dollars in 1998 (Zheng (1999)). We must also note that the Portuguese 
financial system is a universal banking system, in which the financial holding has businesses in 
other areas besides the fiduciary activities. Mutual funds are usually commercialized by the retail 
bank of the holding, and the mutual funds are managed by the holding’s mutual fund 
management company.   
 
The second reason is based on the fact that the information available to the public is unlike that of 
any other market, given that not only is the value of the portfolios managed by the funds and their 
composition published monthly, but also the value of each investment unit is published daily
1,2. 
                                                 
1 As far as we know, Hungary is the only other country in the EU that publishes portfolios (and their value) each 
month, but not for all mutual fund categories.  
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Therefore, in Portugal is it possible to monitor the monthly development of the net flows of 
capital channelled to each fund as well as monitor the daily value of investments and respective 
returns.  
 
The paper analyses the performance reaction of the clients of Portuguese funds investing in 
domestic shares, over a 7 year 3 month period. Our results indicate that a performance reaction is 
only noteworthy, both on the winning as well as the losing side, when the raw return for one year 
is compared to the normalised capital flows of the following year. That reaction is associated to 
the connection between the capital flows during first half-year periods and the return in the prior 
calendar year. For other time horizons and for risk-adjusted returns, a reaction is either not 
detected or the inverted reaction phenomenon is observed, where winners are transformed into 
losers and vice-versa. In spite of this, the analysis of the capital flows of subsequent demand 
periods clearly shows that demand persists both on the winners' side and (especially) on the 
losers' side. Our results also allow one to conclude that financial groups, in particular those with 
higher market shares, are able to channel their customers to their more expensive mutual funds.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we have a brief literature review. Section 3 
describes the dataset. Contingency tables are in section 4, and regression analysis is in section 5. 
Finally, the main conclusions of the paper are summarized in section 6.   
 
2. BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW 
An issue that has been motivating the work of some researchers is that of understanding the type 
of investor response to the performance of mutual funds. This is particularly motivated by the 
fact that some studies show that performance persistence is (especially) observable amongst 
funds recording lower performances (for example, Hendricks et al. (1993), Shukla and Trzcinka 
(1994) and Carhart (1997)).  
 
There is consensus amongst researchers on one point: the capital flows into each mutual fund are 
sensitive to past performances. Several studies have documented this for the US market (Ippolito 
(1992), Gruber (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Sirri and 
                                                                                                                                                              
2 This information is available at the Portuguese Securities Commission website (www.cmvm.pt) since 2002. Before 
2002, some daily newspapers published this information in the markets section. Therefore, the costs of monitoring a 
portfolio of risky assets are negligible.  
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Tufano (1998) and Christoffersen (2001)). What has been intriguing academics is the diversity of 
reaction to higher and lower performance. A number of studies have shown the phenomenon of 
asymmetry, reporting that the better the past performance the greater the attracted flow is for 
superior performances, whereas lower performances don't encompass redemption or negative 
growth rates (Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Sirri 
and Tufano (1998), Lynch and Musto (2000), Christoffersen (2001) and Del Guercio and Tkac 
(2001)). More specifically, the relationship between performance and the flow of the subsequent 
period is convex in nature (Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), amongst 
others). The phenomenon is perceptible both when the return is risk-adjusted and when it is not 
risk-adjusted, in much the same way that such is evident when either absolute performance 
measures are used or when there is reaction to performance rankings.  
 
Christoffersen (2001) documents the phenomenon for funds aimed at institutional and private 
customers. Gruber (1996) claims that there are informed investors capable of foreseeing future 
performance based on past performance, channelling their net investments to funds with better 
future performances (“smart money effect”). These investors are in contrast to another type of 
less informed and less sophisticated consumers, the existence of which justifies the continuation 
of money in funds that will foreseeably record poor performances.  
 
The asymmetry of investor behaviour in mutual funds, expressed through a convex relationship 
between performance and capital flows, certainly has causes. In the absence of transaction costs, 
Ippolito (1992) found that the investor - assuming performance persistence - will tend to choose 
the funds with better recent performances instead of making random choices. Similarly, investors 
will tend to avoid funds with the worst performances. The only obstacles are the costs involved 
with acquiring information, and with the redemption of investments from the worse performing 
funds and the subscription to winning funds. These costs are, in this context, the (rational) 
explanation as to why large market shares are not transferred from some funds to others when the 
fund performances are published. In support of this theory, Ippolito (1992) documents that the net 
flows of funds with lower load costs are more sensitive to performance than the net flows of 
funds with higher load costs. Sirri and Tufano (1998) also concluded that funds with larger fees 
tend to have more sluggish growth than funds with lower fees.  
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Sirri and Tufano (1992), in turn, explain investor behaviour using the operational structure of the 
US mutual fund industry as their basis. They argue that the industry’s exponential growth creates 
confusion and selection difficulty for investors
3. This is worsened by the frequent name changes, 
in addition to the merger and disappearance of existing funds, as well as the constant appearance 
of new funds
4. Simultaneously, the financial industry has been marked by increasing competitive 
complexity. In fact, mutual fund management companies provide different services, at different 
prices, designed with different strategies, aimed at different market segments and distributed 
through distinct marketing channels. Thus, the industry has created differentiated products which, 
with the aid of marketing, increase investor confusion. The underlying idea is, therefore, that the 
operational complexity of the industry gives rise to high costs in obtaining and handling 
information regarding the performance of all existing mutual funds, for which reason those 
investors avoiding these costs make their decisions based on the information made available to 
them, which may be through marketing initiatives or through the media. However, both the 
marketing initiatives and the media tend to emphasize the better performances and not dwell on 
the worse performances (Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Jain and Wu (2000)).  
 
 
Lynch and Musto (2000), in a different type of explanation, propose that the absence of any 
significant reaction to extreme negative performances can be due to the prospect of an alteration 
to investment policy. These researchers put forward that strategy alterations occur after bad 
results, and the expectation of more favourable results associated to the change in strategy could 
be sufficient justification for investors to remain in these segments.  
 
Another approach based on cognitive dissonance phenomena is provided by Goetzmann and 
Peles (1997), who conclude that investors adjust their main beliefs in order to support the (bad) 
choices they have made. These authors suggest that a positive bias exists in investors' memories, 
which is consistent with the absence of any reaction to the worst performances.  
 
                                                 
3 The differentiation of the product as a means of diminishing the importance of performance and complicating its 
use in assessing the achievements of fund managers is an argument subscribed by Lakonishok et al. (1992), in 
relation to pension funds.  
4 The name changing strategy has proven to be quite successful. Cooper et al. (2003) analysed the relationship 
between capital flows and the change of mutual fund names. The results denote that the flows to funds dramatically 
increase when funds change their names to obtain a greater association with the styles that are producing higher 
returns at that time. This outcome is true even for those funds that do not change their portfolios to profiles closer to 
the style implied by the new name.  
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3. DATASET AND VARIABLES 
(i) Sample 
The sample includes all Portuguese open-end mutual funds (30 funds) which were deemed to be 
“domestic equity funds” by APFIN
5, between 31
st December 1993 and 31
st March 2001. This 
means that the sample coincides with the population. 
 
The sample possesses characteristics that are of great bearing on the purposes of this 
investigation: (i) it refers only to the equity funds of one single country
6; (ii) by including all 
funds we avoid survivorship bias; (iii) investments in bonds are of little significance
7, a fact that 
has contributed – just as (i) has too – to increase the effectiveness of performance measurements.  
 
The total assets (monthly average) under the management of these funds is 635.2 million euros, 
with a maximum of 1805.6 million euros (April 1998) and a minimum of 90.4 million euros 
(December 1995). At the end of March 2001 the total NAV was 495.8 million euros. 
 
(ii) Mutual Fund Investment Flow Variables 
To measure the monthly investment flow of each fund two metrics are used: the absolute capital 
flows (CF) and the normalized capital flows (NCF). The absolute capital flows is given by  
( ) t t t t t R NAV I NAV CF + − + = − 1 1  [1] 
where: NAVt is the total net value of the fund’s portfolio, at date t, after the distribution of 
income; It is the income distributed by the mutual fund; and Rt is the return achieved by the fund 
between t-1 and t
8/9.  
 








= . [2] 
                                                 
5 APFIN is the Portuguese association of mutual fund management companies. 
6 The inclusion of foreign shares would mean taking into consideration the systematic risk of other countries. The 
importance of local factors in the calculation of the price of the risk of each one of the return generating factors is 
documented by Serra (2000). 
7 The mean aggregate percentage of domestic shares in the NAV managed by the samples’ funds is 82.0%. 
8 We assume that the income distribution occurs on date t. Events, such as fund mergers, are handled using the 
follow the money approach (Gruber (1996)).  
9 Purchases (net of sales) made by fund of funds of the same financial group were deducted from the total flow, 
thereby ensuring that only capital flows originating from clients outside of the fund complex is considered.  
10 NCF is used by Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Zheng (1999), among others.  
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The first metric favours larger funds that tend to have greater absolute cash flows disassociated 
from performance, while NCF tends to amplify the results of smaller funds (Gruber (1996)). 
Therefore, it is important to use both measurement methods. The exclusive use of the former 
could hide the reaction of the clients of large funds, in much the same way that the exclusive use 
of NCF could lead to the excessive prominence of the reaction of clients of smaller funds.  
 
(iii) Performance Variables 
The mutual funds’ performance was calculated in three distinct ways: (i) the continuous raw 
returns; (ii) Jensen’s alpha, taking the CAPM as the equilibrium model; and (iii) the alpha 
coefficient of Carhart's model (1997), that is, based on a 4 factor APT model, which, besides the 
excess of market return gauged by the return differential of the PSIG Index
11 and the return of the 
LISBOR
12, also includes the HML, SMB and WML factors
13. 
 
(iv) Sources of Information 
The daily price quotation of each fund, the dates and the sums of the distributed incomes, and the 
fund monthly portfolios are from Dathis
14. Market and accounting information for listed 
companies is from Dathis, from the annual publications issued by Euronext Lisbon with yearly 
accounting information on listed companies, and from the daily quotation bulletins of Euronext 
Lisbon. Information regarding the fees charged by each fund was obtained from the funds’ 
management rules published in the quotation bulletins of Euronext Lisbon. Accounting 
information relative to the management companies of the funds is from the quotation bulletins 
and CMVM [Portuguese Securities’ Commission]. The information on banks is from the 
‘Boletim Informativo’ published by the Portuguese Association of Banks.  
 
                                                 
11 We use the PSIG Index (the Euronext general Index for Euronext Lisbon) as the market returns proxy. 
12 We use the Lisbor 3 months (an inter-bank monetary rate) as a proxy of risk-free interest rate. 
13 The HML variable attempts to quantify the book-to-market effect and corresponds to the return of a portfolio that 
is long in high book-to-market stocks and short in low book-to-market stocks; SMB measures the size effect, and 
corresponds to the return of a portfolio that is long in small  caps and short in big  caps; WML measures the 
momentum effect, and is the return of a portfolio long in stock winners and short in recent losers. Due to the reduced 
size of the Portuguese stock market, the small markets methodology of Alves and Mendes (2004) is used in the 
calculation of the HML, SMB and WML factors. 
14 Financial information disclosure service of Euronext Lisbon.  
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4. CONTINGENCY TABLES  
4.1 PERFORMANCE REACTION 
 
(i) Methodological Issues 
Our study of investors’ performance reaction is based on a methodology frequently used to 
analyse both the mutual fund performance persistence (for large
15 and small
16 samples), and the 
response of the funds’ management to performance
17: the analysis of contingency tables. . This 
methodology is appropriate to study small markets (Cortez (1998)). However, regressions 
analysis was also used to check the robustness of our results. 
 
Bi-dimensional tables were used with the variables: i) performance achieved over a given time 
period and ii) new capital flows in the subsequent period
18. The performance was divided into 
two categories, winner (W) and loser (L), according to whether the fund in question achieved an 
above or below median performance. The investor reaction variable is similarly divided into two 
categories, W
* (winner) and L
* (loser), according to whether the fund in question achieved an 
above or below median net capital flow.  
 
If the attraction of new capital flows is independent of performance it would be expected that the 
observations would be equally distributed between the 4 cells of the contingency table. However, 
if good performances are rewarded and bad performances penalised – «the performance reaction 
hypothesis» - then the observations tend to concentrate in WW
* and LL
*. It is possible, 
nevertheless, that other reaction patterns occur, which lead to winners being transformed into 
losers and vice-versa – «the inverted reaction hypothesis».  
 
In terms of the statistical tests used, the chi-square test was firstly applied - with and without the 
Yates continuity correction – which is based on the expected frequency of each cell
19. The other 
tests used are the following: the cross-product ratio, also known as the odds ratio test or relative 
risk test
20 (to test the independence of two variables in a multinomial sample), the joint repetition 
test of Pesaran and Timmermann (1992), and the repetition of winners /losers Malkiel (1995) test.  
                                                 
15 Vide Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Malkiel (1995) and Kahn and Rudd (1995). 
16 Vide Cortez (1998).  
17 Vide Busse (2001) and Goriaev et al. (2005). 
18 Different time horizons were considered in order to assess the robustness of the results. 
19 The independence hypothesis of performance rankings and the rankings of capital flows of the following period is 
the null hypothesis of all the formulated tests. Vide Everitt (1977, p.14) and Conover (1999, p.190), in addition to 
others. 
20 Vide Everitt (1977, p.31) and Brown and Goetzmann (1995).  
10 
 
(ii) Preceding Period Performance Reaction  
Table 1 presents the main results.  The risk-adjusted performance reaction hypothesis is rejected. 
The only circumstance in which a reaction exists is when the (Y/Y)
21 annual period is considered 
and the returns are non-risk-adjusted (raw returns). But, even in this case, the reaction of clients is 
only noticeable for NCF, and no perceptible significance is observed using the measurement that 
would (theoretically) benefit demand for bigger mutual funds (CF).  










2 Aj. p CP p RR p RW p RL p
128 143 143 127 1.78 0.09 * 1.55 0.11 0,79 0.09 * 0.47 0.09 * 0.47 0.18 0.47 0.17
59 63 67 59 0.57 0.22 0.56 0.23 0.82 0.22 0.48 0.22 0.48 0.36 0.47 0.24
125 121 126 130 0.13 0.36 0.07 0.39 1.07 0.36 0.51 0.36 0.51 0.40 0.51 0.40
26 25 29 29 0.01 0.46 0.01 0.47 1.04 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.51 0.44 0.50 0.50
131 141 140 129 0.82 0.18 0.67 0.21 0.86 0.18 0.48 0.18 0.48 0.27 0.48 0.25
57 66 69 56 1.95 0.08 * 1.93 0.08 * 0.70 0.08 * 0.46 0.08 * 0.46 0.21 0.45 0.12
120 135 131 116 1.79 0.09 * 1.56 0.11 0.79 0.09 * 0.47 0.09 * 0.47 0.17 0.47 0.17
28 23 27 31 0.76 0.19 0.71 0.20 1.40 0.19 0.54 0.19 0.55 0.24 0.53 0.30
129 144 142 126 1.78 0.09 * 1.56 0.11 0.79 0.09 * 0.47 0.09 * 0.47 0.18 0.47 0.16
56 68 70 54 3.16 0.04 ** 3.14 0.04 ** 0.64 0.04 ** 0.44 0.04 ** 0.45 0.14 0.44 0.08 *
115 137 136 114 3.86 0.02 ** 3.51 0.03 ** 0.70 0.02 ** 0.46 0.02 ** 0.46 0.08 * 0.46 0.08 *
27 25 28 29 0.09 0.39 0.07 0.40 1.12 0.39 0.51 0.38 0.52 0.39 0.51 0.45
128 143 141 129 1.35 0.12 1.15 0.14 0.82 0.12 0.48 0.12 0.47 0.18 0.48 0.23
60 62 65 61 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.91 0.35 0.49 0.35 0.49 0.43 0.48 0.36
124 122 126 130 0.07 0.40 0.03 0.43 1.05 0.40 0.51 0.39 0.50 0.45 0.51 0.40
29 22 25 33 2.06 0.08 * 1.98 0.08 * 1.74 0.08 * 0.57 0.07 * 0.57 0.16 0.57 0.15
129 143 140 129 1.15 0.14 0.98 0.16 0.83 0.14 0.48 0.14 0.47 0.20 0.48 0.25
59 64 66 59 0.58 0.22 0.57 0.23 0.82 0.22 0.48 0.22 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.27
126 129 124 123 0.03 0.43 0.01 0.46 0.97 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.47
26 25 28 30 0.08 0.39 0.07 0.40 1.11 0.39 0.51 0.39 0.51 0.44 0.52 0.40
134 139 135 133 0.09 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.95 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.34 0.49 0.40
61 63 64 60 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.91 0.35 0.49 0.35 0.49 0.43 0.48 0.36
123 129 127 123 0.20 0.33 0.13 0.36 0.92 0.33 0.49 0.33 0.49 0.35 0.49 0.40
24 28 30 27 0.46 0.25 0.42 0.26 0.77 0.25 0.47 0.25 0.46 0.29 0.47 0.35
Losers Test
Test of Pesaran Repeat
Winners Test



























Panel A:  Absolute Capital Flow (FC)










Obs.: (i) Q/Q, S/S, Y/Q and Y/Y identify the time horizon for performance (first symbol) and capital flows (second symbol), where Q, S and Y 
represent respectively the quarter, the half-year and the year; (ii) WW
* is the number of funds that were double winners (performance rankings of 
a given period and capital flows rankings of the subsequent period); LL
* identifies the number of funds that were double losers (performance 
rankings of a given period and capital flows rankings of the subsequent period); WL
* is the number of funds that were winners on performance 
rankings and losers on capital flows rankings of the subsequent period; e LW
* identifies the number of funds that were losers on performance 
rankings and winners on capital flows rankings of the subsequent period; (iii) χ
2 identifies the qui-square statistic; χ
2 Aj. identifies the qui-square 
statistic after the Yates adjustment; CP identifies the cross product (odds ratio); RR identifies Pesaran and Timmermann repetition percentage; 
RW (RL) identifies the percentage of repetition of winners (losers); p identifies the p-values for one-sided tests; (iv) the symbols ***, ** and * 
show statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
                                                 





The independence hypothesis is not even rejected in favour of the performance reaction 
hypothesis when the performance is measured in quarterly terms (Q/Q) nor when calculated in 
annual terms (Y/Q). On the contrary, evidence of the inverse reaction of the CF variable exists, 
relative to the raw returns of the previous quarter (Q/Q), and there is evidence of inverse reaction 
for both quarterly (only with the Carhart Model) risk-adjusted returns as well as for those of the 
previous year. When the half-year period is used as the time horizon (S/S), the same conclusion 
applies, i.e. that the only situation of rejection of the independence hypothesis occurs with the use 
of non-normalised capital flows (CF) and risk-adjusted returns. Thus, funds with the worst risk-
adjusted performances occupy the top places of the ranking of capital flows in the following half-
year.  
 
In short, no evidence exists that the clients of funds react to performance, with the exception of 
the comparison of normalised annual flows with non-risk adjusted returns relative to the 
preceding year (Y/Y). On the contrary, in terms of risk-adjusted performance, a perceptible 
phenomenon of inverted reaction was observed, where the winners are transformed into losers 
and the losers converted into winners, whenever the reaction of clients is assessed in terms of 
absolute flows, in half-yearly (S/S) and quarterly (Q/Q) terms.  
 
(iii) Prior Calendar Year Performance Reaction  
The evidence that investors react to the performance of funds in Y/Y terms, and that no reaction 
exists in Y/Q terms, raises the suspicion that investors are only sensitive to the performance 
relative to each calendar year. Therefore, it is important to assess to what extent investors 
memorise the performances of each calendar year and react in function of these. Table 2 reports 
the results obtained from comparing the performance of each calendar year with the demand in 
the four quarters of the following year.  
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2 Aj. p CP p RR p RW p RL p
41 28 29 39 3.86 0.02 ** 1.79 0.09 * 1.97 0.03 ** 0.58 0.02 ** 0.59 0.06 * 0.57 0.11
31 24 24 35 2.80 0.05 ** 0.77 0.19 1.88 0.05 ** 0.58 0.05 * 0.56 0.17 0.59 0.08 *
29 31 33 31 0.13 0.36 0.12 0.37 0.88 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.40 0.48 0.40
23 31 33 29 1.31 0.13 0.13 0.36 0.65 0.13 0.45 0.13 0.43 0.14 0.47 0.31
37 33 33 34 0.18 0.34 0.04 0.42 1.16 0.34 0.52 0.34 0.53 0.32 0.51 0.45
28 28 27 31 0.14 0.36 0.19 0.33 1.15 0.36 0.52 0.36 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.30
30 30 32 32 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.24 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
26 31 30 29 0.32 0.29 0.05 0.42 0.81 0.29 0.47 0.29 0.46 0.25 0.49 0.45
38 31 31 37 1.23 0.13 0.23 0.31 1.46 0.13 0.55 0.13 0.55 0.20 0.54 0.23
34 21 22 37 6.85 0.00 *** 3.31 0.03 ** 2.72 0.00 *** 0.62 0.00 *** 0.62 0.04 ** 0.63 0.03 **
27 33 33 31 0.53 0.23 0.00 0.49 0.77 0.23 0.47 0.23 0.45 0.22 0.48 0.40
25 29 32 30 0.33 0.28 0.04 0.42 0.81 0.28 0.47 0.28 0.46 0.29 0.48 0.40
39 31 30 37 1.64 0.10 0.43 0.26 1.55 0.10 0.55 0.10 * 0.56 0.17 0.55 0.20
27 29 29 29 0.04 0.42 0.37 0.27 0.93 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.48 0.39 0.50 0.50
31 29 29 35 0.50 0.24 0.00 0.50 1.29 0.24 0.53 0.24 0.52 0.40 0.55 0.23
27 30 30 29 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.34 0.87 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.47 0.35 0.49 0.45





Panel A:  Absolute Capital Flow (FC)
Civil Year/1Q
Repeat


















Civil Year/4Q  
Obs.: (i) This table relates the capital flows of the first (Q1), second (Q2), third (Q3) and fourth (Q4) quarters with the performance  
calculated for the previous civil year (January 1
th to December 31
 th); (ii) In other aspects, this table should be read similarly to Table 1.  
 
The results indicate that the flows of new capital in the first (Q1) and second quarters (Q2) react 
to the absolute returns of the previous calendar year, but the same does not occur over the rest of 
the year. It can thus be concluded that investors react to the absolute returns of each calendar 
year, but they only memorise those results during the first six months of the year. A possible 
explanation of this result is the low level of the dissemination of information on risk-adjusted 
performance in the media, in comparison with the profusion of information published at the start 
of each year regarding the rankings of the previous year, as well as the absence of the update of 
information relative to the absolute returns of the preceding 12 months
22. Investors, aware of the 
out-of-date nature of the information, invest in the last two quarters of the year without the 
“beacon” that guides investment decisions in the first six months of the year.  
 
4.2 PERFORMANCE ANTICIPATION 
 
In 3.1. the reaction of investors to past performance was analysed. However, Gruber (1996) and 
Zheng (1999) provide evidence that investors have some capacity to anticipate performance (“the 
                                                 
22 This result is in line with the evidence reported by Sirri and Tufano (1998), in addition to others, according to 
which the attention given to prior performance depends on the marketing efforts of each management company and 
the attention it obtains in the media.  
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smart money effect”)
23. If this phenomenon exists, capital flows are significantly correlated to 
future performances. In this section we shall test to see if this is the case with our sample
24.    
 
The observations are distributed amongst the cells of the contingency table relative to the 
rankings of demand (CF or NCF) for a given period and the performance rankings of the 
immediately subsequent period. The null hypothesis corresponds to the «independence 
hypothesis» between demand rankings and performance rankings in the following period, the 
alternatives to which are the «smart money effect hypothesis» and the «dumb or misled money 
hypothesis»
25.  










2 Aj. p CP p RR p RW p RL p
135 138 138 130 0.23 0.32 0.15 0.35 0.92 0.32 0.49 0.32 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.31
62 64 63 59 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.91 0.35 0.49 0.35 0.49 0.43 0.48 0.36
28 27 28 26 0.01 0.46 0.01 0.47 0.96 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.51 0.45 0.48 0.39
135 138 140 128 0.42 0.26 0.32 0.29 0.89 0.26 0.49 0.26 0.49 0.43 0.48 0.23
60 66 66 56 1.04 0.15 1.03 0.16 0.77 0.15 0.47 0.15 0.48 0.30 0.46 0.18
26 29 30 24 0.75 0.19 0.70 0.20 0.72 0.19 0.46 0.19 0.47 0.34 0.44 0.21
131 142 143 125 1.56 0.11 1.35 0.12 0.81 0.11 0.47 0.11 0.48 0.25 0.47 0.14
54 72 72 50 6.48 0.01 *** 6.44 0.01 *** 0.52 0.01 *** 0.42 0.01 *** 0.43 0.05 * 0.41 0.02 **
26 29 30 24 0.75 0.19 0.70 0.20 0.72 0.19 0.46 0.19 0.47 0.34 0.44 0.21
141 127 132 141 0.98 0.16 0.82 0.18 1.19 0.16 0.52 0.16 0.53 0.20 0.52 0.29
60 64 65 59 0.40 0.26 0.39 0.26 0.85 0.26 0.48 0.26 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.30
26 28 30 25 0.45 0.25 0.41 0.26 0.77 0.25 0.47 0.25 0.48 0.39 0.45 0.25
136 132 139 134 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.48 0.99 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.51 0.40 0.49 0.38
58 66 68 56 1.61 0.10 1.60 0.10 0.72 0.10 0.46 0.10 0.47 0.24 0.45 0.14
22 32 34 21 4.85 0.01 ** 4.73 0.01 ** 0.42 0.01 ** 0.39 0.01 ** 0.41 0.09 * 0.38 0.04 **
131 137 143 130 0.66 0.21 0.53 0.23 0.87 0.21 0.48 0.21 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.22
55 69 71 53 4.13 0.02 ** 4.10 0.02 ** 0.60 0.02 ** 0.44 0.02 ** 0.44 0.10 0.43 0.05 *
21 33 35 20 6.68 0.00 *** 6.54 0.01 *** 0.36 0.01 *** 0.38 0.00 *** 0.39 0.05 * 0.36 0.02 **
Panel A:  Absolute Capital Flow (FC)




























Table Adjust. of Yates Test and Timmerman
Repeat
Losers Test




*W identifies the number of funds that were double winners (capital flows rankings of a given period and performance rankings of the 
subsequent period); L
*L is the number of funds that were double losers (capital flows rankings of a given period and performance rankings of the 
subsequent period); W
*L identifies the number of funds that were winners on capital flows rankings of a given period and losers on performance 
rankings of the subsequent period; e L
*W is the number of funds that were losers on capital flows rankings of a given period and winners on 
performance rankings of the subsequent period; (ii) In other aspects, this table should be read similarly to Table 1. 
                                                 
23 In Zheng (1999) the evidence is concentrated around the flows of smaller funds. 
24 It should be noted that this exercise is opportune, even if performance persistence doesn't exist. In fact, Zheng 
(1999) documented that the phenomenon of “smart money” cannot be fully explained by the “pursuit” of previous 
returns, therefore specific information on each additional fund exists that is incorporated into the investors' decision.  
25 Winning (losing) funds in terms of demand record an increased probability of being losers (winners) in 
performance in the following period.  
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Results are in Table 3. The smart money hypothesis is always rejected. On the contrary, half-
yearly (S/S) and annual (Y/Y) analyses recorded situations of rejection of the independence 
hypothesis in favour of the dumb or misled money hypothesis. In other words, the new capital 
flows recorded half-year to half-year and year to year periods favour funds that in the following 
half-year period (Carhart Model) or following year period (CAPM and Carhart Model) perform 
worse in terms of risk-adjusted returns
26.  
 
4.3. DEMAND PERSISTENCE 
 
In this section funds are assessed to see if they are persistent winners and/or losers relative to the 
rankings of net capital flows (CF or NCF). The rankings of each one of the demand variables for 
a given period and in the immediately subsequent period are compared (Table 4).  
 
TABLE 4 – INVESTOR DEMAND PERSISTENCE 
Test of Χ
2
W*W* W*L* L*W* L*L* χ
2
p χ
2 Aj. pP C pR R pR W pR L p
178 94 87 178 57.11 0.00 *** 55.8 0.00 *** 3.87 0.00 *** 0.66 0.00 *** 0.65 0.00 *** 0.67 0.00 ***
79 46 41 80 21.15 0.00 *** 21.09 0.00 *** 3.35 0.00 *** 0.65 0.00 *** 0.63 0.00 *** 0.66 0.00 ***
29 26 22 32 1.57 0.10 1.51 0.11 1.62 0.11 0.56 0.10 0.53 0.34 0.59 0.09 *
152 114 105 166 18.21 0.00 *** 17.5 0.00 *** 2.11 0.00 *** 0.59 0.00 *** 0.57 0.01 *** 0.61 0.00 ***
71 53 46 76 9.43 0.00 *** 9.39 0.00 *** 2.21 0.00 *** 0.60 0.00 *** 0.57 0.05 * 0.62 0.00 ***
28 26 20 35 2.65 0.05 * 2.57 0.05 * 1.88 0.05 * 0.58 0.05 * 0.52 0.39 0.64 0.02 **
Repeat Test of Χ
2 Odds Ratio Test of Pesaran Repeat Contingency




Panel A:  Absolute Capital Flow (FC)
S/S
Y/Y
Panel B:  Normalised Capital Flow (NFC)
Q/Q
 
Obs.: (i) W*W*, W*L*, L*W* e L*L* identify, respectively, the number of funds that were double winners, initially winners and then losers, 
initially losers and then winners, and double losers; (ii) In other aspects, this table should be read similarly to Table 1.  
 
There is strong evidence of persistence, both in relation to winners and, above all, in relation to 
losers. In fact, our results indicate the persistence of winners and of losers, in both quarterly and 
half-yearly terms. In annual terms, the persistence of losers only was observed. This means that, 
in general, the ranking of a period and the ranking of the following period are not independent. 
On the contrary, winners are repeatedly winners and losers are repeatedly losers.  
 
Analysis fund by fund
27 allows one to conclude that there are funds that are systematically 
winners (12 funds, using absolute quarterly flows). Ten other funds (that is, a third of the sample) 
are repeatedly losers. These results confirm, therefore, the demand persistence shown in Table 4.  
                                                 
26 The evidence, though not as strong in terms of absolute flows, points in the same direction, especially in the half-
yearly analyses. 
27 Non-reported results.  
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5. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
The methodology used in this section is similar to that used by Carhart (1997)
28 and Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), which consists of individually analysing the observations of each period
29. In 
other words, an explanatory model of the NCF variable was estimated for each month, using, 
therefore, just one observation per fund. Then, considering the time series of the coefficients, the 
estimates of each coefficient were calculated, as well as the respective t statistics, using the 
method of Fama and MacBeth (1973). This method hinders any potential dependence on periodic 
observations, and it is noted for producing more conservative conclusions regarding the 
individual significance of each one of the variables.  
 
The range of explanatory variables included only variables of a sectional nature (prone to 
variation from fund to fund). The first one was the performance recorded in the preceding period 
(PERFT-1), calculated in a number of ways in order to check the robustness of the results and 
given the fact that the performance measurement to which the investors react is not clear. As for 
the calculation method, raw returns and the alphas of the model of Carhart were used. The 
following periods were tested (see Table 5): the month (Panel A), quarter (Panel B) and year 
(Panel C) prior to the period for which the calculation of the dependent variable (NCF) was 
made. Other control variables are the fund’s market share (of domestic equity funds) in the 
previous quarter (QFt-1) and the respective management company's share (QSGt-1) in the domestic 
mutual fund market in the three preceding months. In a number of studies the size of the fund or 
the fund complex into which the fund is incorporated is used as a proxy for the costs of acquiring 
information that each investor is faced with
30. In the context of the reduced dimension of the 
Portuguese market, the share of each management company can be regarded as an indicator of 
the size of the financial group, for which reason it can be seen as an indicator of that financial 
                                                 
28 In a study of the determining factors of fund performance and performance persistence. 
29 Despite the fact that our sample is a pool of time and sectional-based data, the use of OLS on the entire pool could 
lead to incorrect inferences: “the models can be estimated on the entire dataset as a pool, in which each firm-year 
observation is considered an independent observation. This technique may inappropriately underestimate standard 
errors and overestimate t-statistics if each fund-year is not an independent observation” - Sirri and Tufano (1998, p. 
1597). 
30 Sirri and Tufano (1998), for instance, assess the reputation of each fund and each fund complex using the lagged 
logarithm of the total amount of managed assets. The underlying idea is that the largest fund complexes have greater 
visibility and therefore investors will preferentially opt, minimizing the costs of obtaining information, for the larger 
funds and fund complexes. The need to include both the size of each fund as well as the size of the management 
company is based on the fact that the largest companies usually possess more than one equity fund, so it is important 
to distinguish the reputation of the fund from the reputation of the company managing it.  
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group's capacity to attract investment from private clients.  
 
It is known that the normalised capital flows benefit (younger and) smaller funds. Therefore, in 
order to understand by how much the effect attributed to QFt-1 is a reflection of the reputation of 
the fund or the (natural) mirror of the loss of market share of the oldest and larger funds, the age 
of each fund (ID) is included amongst the explanatory variables. ID is the quarterly average of 
the number of years since the fund started operations, calculated at the beginning of each month.  
 
Two other variables were tested: the lagged dependent variable (NCFt-1) and the next period 
performance (PERFt+1). With the first variable, we intend to confirm the demand persistence 
phenomenon reported in table 4. As for PERFt+1, it allows one to test the absence of the smart 
money effect reported in table 3. 
 
Finally, the total cost of each mutual fund (which includes subscription, management, custody 
and redemption costs), assuming a five year investment horizon (CT60M), is included as a 
regressor.  
 
TABLE 5 – NORMALIZED CAPITAL FLOW REGRESSIONS  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
C 0.037 * 0.038 0.046 * 0.106 0.014 -0.037 -0.037 -0.035
1.45 0.46 1.35 1.36 0.81 -0.96 -0.58 -0.92
PERFT-1 -3.998 -28.794 -19.987 -49.691 -10.837 * -14.006 -46.325 -40.534
-0.55 -0.77 -1.27 -1.00 -1.48 -0.57 -0.31 -0.39
QFt-1 -0.120 ** -0.316 *** -0.122 ** -0.274 *** -0.118 *** -0.297 *** -0.208 *** -0.311 ***
-2.25 -2.57 -2.25 -3.13 -2.35 -2.43 -2.55 -2.53
CT60M 0.323 ** 0.833 *** 0.390 *** 0.846 *** 0.317 ** 0.722 ** 0.657 ** 0.643 **
2.32 2.50 2.71 2.54 2.31 2.17 1.87 1.72
QSGt-1 0.092 *** 0.147 0.097 *** 0.011 0.091 *** 0.071 * -0.031 0.053
2.40 0.99 2.49 0.14 2.37 1.28 -0.49 1.09
ID -0.006 *** -0.004 -0.005 *** -0.002 -0.005 *** -0.001 0.000 -0.002
-5.06 -1.18 -3.87 -0.68 -3.82 -0.33 -0.05 -0.88
NCFT-1 0.177 ** 0.111 0.180 *** 0.184 *** 0.192 ***
1.77 0.97 2.64 2.39 3.00
PERFT+1 10.638 41.811 22.286 40.974 9.877
0.36 0.91 1.16 0.35 0.14
Annual Performance
Carhart Model
Panel A Panel B Panel C





Obs.: (i) the dependent variable is the normalized capital flow (NCF), calculated for each fund; (ii) the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method was applied 




The Fama-MacBeth coefficient estimates are in Table 5. It can be concluded that the funds with 
the largest market share in the equity fund segment tend to grow less rapidly than smaller funds, 
in much the same way that old funds tend to lose market share to young funds
31. In fact, the 
estimated coefficient of QFt-1 is significantly negative in all regressions, which means that bigger 
funds tend to lose market share; and the mutual fund age variable (ID) exhibits a negative 
coefficient in all regressions
32, meaning that the youngest founds are preferred by capital inflows.  
 
Moreover, the most expensive funds are the most successful in attracting new capital flows
33. 
Consistent with these results is the idea that management companies use the discretionary power 
resulting from their reputation and the unwillingness of their customers to bear information 
acquisition costs (or the lower investor sophistication) to channel the savings entrusted to them to 
these more expensive funds. 
 
On the other hand, given that the new funds launched in the Portuguese market have costs that 
are on average 30.5% higher than the equity funds of the same management company existing at 
the time the new fund is launched, it can be concluded that management companies were able to 
launch new funds with higher costs for investors (instead of increasing fees for existing funds
34) 
and still attract investors. So, there is evidence that financial groups drive their costumers to 
funds with larger fees, and we can (at least) suspect that they launch new (and more expensive 
funds) funds with this objective. Moreover, new funds launched by companies that have never 
previously managed equity funds are on average 15.5% cheaper, which means that the launch of 
new and more expensive funds exists - mainly - as a phenomenon amongst the largest 
management companies. 
 
As regards performance, there is no perceptible evidence that fund investors react to past 
performance. The phenomenon of inverted reaction is marginally perceptible in regression 5 
only. There is no evidence in favour of the smart money effect as well. 
 
                                                 
31 Worthy of note is the fact that in unreported analyses (in order to economise space), the negative effect of the ID 
(age) variable on absolute capital flows (CF) is similarly documented.  
32 And significant in the short versions of the model. 
33 The coefficient of CT60M is always positive and significant. 
34 In our sample, there is no case of increasing fees for existing funds.  
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Finally, positive and significant coefficients for NCFt-1 where found in all but one regressions, 
which can be interpreted as evidence of persistence of demand (as in table 4). 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Existing literature documents, for the USA, evidence of investor reaction to past performances, as 
well as asymmetry of reaction. Different explanations have been put forward for this type of 
behaviour. These include the complexity (and the confusion) that the industry manages to create 
through its growth and the differentiation of the products on offer. Such complexity increases the 
costs of obtaining information and it would explain why there is only a performance reaction for 
funds whose marketing efforts and the attention afforded by the media provide information at 
reduced costs. There are grounds to believe that the more complex the mutual fund industry 
becomes the greater this problem will be. If one reverses the argument, we may believe that in 
small markets we have symmetry of reaction 
 
However, small markets are less developed and competitive, and the information dissemination 
process is likely less efficient. Therefore, absence of mutual fund performance reaction is 
possible. So, in the absence of known literature on the subject, it is important to investigate 
whether the behaviour reported for the US market is paralleled in smaller and less complex 
markets.  
 
We found that, in the Portuguese market, fund investors do not generally react to performance. 
On the contrary, in terms of risk-adjusted performance it was perceptible that, in many 
circumstances, the winners are transformed into losers and the losers into winners. The smart 
money hypothesis was also studied and rejected, given that the capital flows do not favour funds 
that obtained higher performances in the subsequent period. The hypothesis of demand 
persistence is elected, suggesting that the characteristics of each fund or of each management 
company can be relevant in explaining the behaviour of demand.  
 
 
It was also concluded that bigger funds tend to loose market share, and that the most expensive 
funds grow relatively faster than other funds. Additionally, given that management companies 
with more than one fund launch new funds that are more expensive than the ones they currently  
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manage, we conclude that these companies possess the capacity to “divert” investors from older 
funds to the more expensive funds (which are, in some cases, the more recently created mutual 
funds). These results provide, therefore, a possible explanation for the absence of systematic 
performance reaction.  
 
In short, this study demonstrates the absence of risk-adjusted performance reaction in a small 
market. This seems to be particularly associated to investor behaviour in the second semester. If 
we assume that there is more information and marketing at the end of a year than during the first 
half-year period, then these results can be considered as supporting the theory (of Sirri and 
Tufano (1998)) that investors in order to minimise costs use the information available to them, 
which is asymmetrical, favouring the winners and, (supposedly) unbalanced in time, benefiting 
the annual rankings of absolute returns. Given that the Portuguese market is small, and that the 
costs of acquiring information on the daily value of each investment unit are negligible, the 
absence of reaction can be attributed to either lower investor sophistication, conflicts of interests 
in the context of the Portuguese universal banking industry, or the existence of relevant back-end 
load cost which prevent investors from reacting. This deserves further research.  
 
A number of regulatory policy implications emerge from this paper. Firstly, the importance of the 
existence of continuous public dissemination mechanisms regarding the performance of different 
mutual funds seems to be evident. Similarly, the creation of conditions that allow capital to be 
transferred from one fund to another at the lowest possible cost seems to be important. Moreover, 
it seems evident that financial intermediaries have a wide margin of influence on the fund 
selection decisions of their clients, using this margin of manoeuvre to channel investment to 
funds with higher fees. When applied to funds with the same investment policy, and the same 
level of service, this practice emerges as a non-transparent means of increasing prices, a fact 
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